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Evans v. Smith
220 F.3d 306 (4th Cir. 2000)
L Facts
On April 28, 1983, Susan Kennedy and David Scott Piechowicz died
of multiple gunshot wounds while working in the lobby of the Warren
House Motel in Baltimore County, Maryland.' At the state trial, the
prosecution presented the testimony of several witnesses that linked Vernon
Lee Evans, Jr. ("Evans") to the crimes.2
Evans was convicted in state court on two counts of first degree mur-
der, conspiracy to commit murder, and the use of a handgun to commit a
felony or violent crime.' The jury sentenced Evans to death on both counts
of murder.4 The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal.' In the state
post-conviction proceeding, the Circuit Court for Worcester County found
that the form used in sentencing Evans was unconstitutional and ordered re-
sentencing.6 At re-sentencing, the jury sentenced Evans to death for both
murder convictions.! The convictions were then upheld in the second state
post-conviction proceeding Evans then filed a petition for federal habeas
corpus relief, which was denied.9 The district court also denied Evans's
motion to stay its consideration while he exhausted his claim based upon
1. Evans v. Smith, 220 F.3d 306,309(4th Cir. 2000). Susan-Kennedy was working in
place of her sister Cheryl Piechowicz. The Piechowiczes were supposed to testify against
Anthony Grandison in a federal narcotics case. The defendant, Vernon Lee Evans, Jr.,
allegedly was hired by Grandison to kill the Piechowiczes. Id.
2. Id. at 310.
3. Id. at 309-10. In federal district court, Evans was convicted of witness tampering
and interfering with the Piechowiczes' right to testify against Grandison. Evans was sen-
tenced to life plus ten years in prison for these offenses. Id. at 309.
4. Id. at 310. The jury sentenced Evans to life in prison for the conviction of conspir-
acy to commit murder and twenty years in prison for the use of a handgun in the crime. Id.
5. Evans v. State, 499 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Md. 1985).
6. Evans, 220 F.3d at 310.
7. Id. Evans's counsel stressed mitigation evidence during the re-sentencing hearing.
Id. The sentences at re-sentencing were affirmed on direct appeal. Id.; see Evans v. State, 637
A.2d 117, 136 (Md. 1994).
8. Evans, 220 F.3d at 310-11; see Evans v. State, 693 A.2d 780, 780 (Md. 1997).
9. Evans, 220 F.3d at 311; see Evans v. Smith, 54 F. Supp. 2d 503, 539 (D. Md. 1999).
Evans claimed that the prosecution used peremptory challenges based on racial considerations
and that his counsel was ineffective at re-sentencing. Evans, 220 F.3d at 311.
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Brady v. Maryland"0 in the state courts.'" After Evans exhausted his state
remedies, he filed a second petition for federal habeas relief, containing only
the Brady claim, simultaneously with a request to file the petition for habeas
relief as a second or successive petition. 2 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied the second habeas petition. 3 Evans
appealed the district court's denial of habeas relief and challenged the
Fourth Circuit's denial of his request for leave to file the second federal
habeas petition. Evans made the following arguments: (1) the prosecution
unlawfully used peremptory challenges to discriminate against African-
American jurors; (2) defense counsel's performance at re-sentencing consti-
tuted ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) the district court erred by denying
his motion to stay the federal habeas proceedings until he exhausted his
Brady claim in state court; and (4) Evans was exempt from the prohibition
against second or successive habeas petitions.4
Il. Holding
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected all
of Evans's claims, affirmed the district court's denial of Evans's first habeas
corpus petition and the district court's denial of the stay of the first habeas
proceeding.'" The court concluded that Evans was prohibited from present-
ing a second petition for writ of habeas corpus. 6
III. Analysis /Application in Virginia
The Fourth Circuit analyzed Evans's habeas claim pursuant to the
standard mandated by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 ("AEDPA")."' The Fourth Circuit noted that it would assume that
10. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
11. Evans, 220 F.3d at 311; see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (finding
suppression of evidence a due process violation when evidence is favorable to the defendant
and material to guilt or punishment).
12. Evans, 220 F.3d at 311; see 28 U.S.C. S 2244(b)(2)(A), (B) (2000) (requiring dismissal
of a second or successive habeas corpus application unless the claim is based on a new
constitutional law, or the facts supporting the claim could not have been discovered earlier
despite due diligence and, if proven, would establish by clear and convincing evidence that
no reasonable fact-finder would have found the defendant guilty of the offense). Evans also
requested that the district court consider his second habeas petition as a motion to reopen his
first habeas petition. Evans, 220 F.3d at 311; see FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
13. Evans, 220 F.3d at 311; see In re Evans, No. 00-1 (4th Cir. Feb. 16, 2000) (order by
the Fourth Circuit denying defendant permission to file second'habeas petition).
14. Evans, 220 F.3d at 312, 316, 321, 322-23.
15. Id. at 325.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 311-12; see Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Star. 1214 (1996) (amending 28 U.S.C. Title 153). When reviewing a claim that has
[Vol. 13:1
EVANS V. SMITH
the factual findings of the state court were correct unless clear and convinc-
ing evidence was presented to refute this assumption.' I
A. Constitutionality of Peremptory Challenges
Evans's first daim was that the prosecution employed its peremptory
challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. Batson v. Kentucky
2°
provided a three-step test for determining whether the jury selection process
was racially discriminatory.' First, the defendant must present a prima
facie case that the prosecution has employed peremptory challenges in a
racially discriminatory fashion.' Second, if defendant provides a prima
facie case, the State must show that its motivation in choosing the jury was
race neutral.2 In order to do this, the prosecutor is required to give a "clear
and reasonably specific explanation ofhis legitimate reasons for exercising
the challenges." 2' The Fourth Circuit also noted that the explanation for
the peremptory challenge "does not demand an explanation that is persua-
sive, or even plausible." 5s The State is required to give a reason that affords
equal protection, but not one that necessarily makes sense.26 Third, if the
prosecution provides a race neutral explanation, the court must determine
whether the defendant has shown that the prosecutor purposefully discrimi-
nated against jurors based on race .2  The Evans court stressed that it must
afford deference to the trial court's decision regarding the discriminatory
nature of the peremptory challenges because the decision will often depend
already been decided on the merits in state court, federal habeas relief can only be granted if
the state proceeding either "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States," oi "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding."
Evans, 220 F.3d at 313 (quoting 28 U.S.C. 5 2254 (d)(1), (2)).
18. Evans, 220 F.3d at 312; see 28 U.S.C. S 2254(e)(1) (2000) (state court factual finding
will be presumed correct when applicant for writ of habeas corpus is in custody pursuant to
a state court judgment).
19. Evans, 220 F.3d at 312.
20. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
21. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93-98 (1986) (finding that prosecutor's challenge
of jurors on racial considerations alone was unconstitutional).
22. Id. at 96-97.
23. Id. at 97.
24. Id. at 98.
25. Evans, 220 F.3d at 312 (citingPurkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-68 (1995) (finding
prosecutor's claim that peremptory challenge was exercised because of juror's moustache,
beard, and hair style constituted a nondiscriminatory explanation for use of peremptory
challenge)).
26. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768-69.
27. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.
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on the behavior and credibility of the attorney making the peremptory
challenges."
Evans argued that the state courts did not apply Batson and that the
analysis employed did not comply with the requirements mandated by
Batson.29 Therefore, Evans concluded that he was entitled to a new trial
because the state court decisions were "contrary to... clearly established
Federal law." According to the Fourth Circuit, the state courts' analyses
were consistent with the Batson analysis." The court noted that at trial, the
prosecution was warned against using peremptory challenges based on racial
considerations. 2 After the defense objected to the prosecution's use of
peremptory challenges, the prosecutor offered a race-neutral explanation for
the challenges." The Fourth Circuit noted that Batson did not require
individualized explanations for peremptory challenges." Evans provided no
further support for his claim of purposeful discrimination. The trial court,
evidencing its belief that the peremptory challenges were not used in a
racially impermissible fashion, overruled Evans's objection.' The Fourth
Circuit noted that the Maryland Court of Appeals'used an analysis similar
to Batson in its rejection of Evans's claim. 7 The court noted that disturbing
the trial court finding would require the Fourth Circuit to render judgment
on issues that the trial court was uniquely positioned to determine. 8 It
refused to do so and upheld the state court adjudications. 9
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Evans claimed that at his re-sentencing he was denied effective assis-
tance of counsel guaranteed to him by the Sixth Amendment." In Strick-
28. Evans, 220 F.3d at 313.
29. Id.
30. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1) (2000).
31. Evans, 220 F.3d at 313.
32. Id. at 313-14. The Fourth Circuit also noted that the jury selection occurred two
years before the Batson decision. Id. at 314.
33. Id. at 314. The trial court gave the prosecution an opportunity to explain its use
of peremptory challenges. The prosecutor claimed that challenges were based on back-
ground, age, occupation, and answers during voir dire, not race. The court overruled Evans's




37. Id. at 315; see Evans v. State, 499 A.2d 1261 (Md. 1985).
38. Evans, 220 F.3d at 316.
39. Id.
40. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution reads, in relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." Id.
[Vol. 13:1
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land v. Washington,4 the United States Supreme Court established the
standard for determining ineffective assistance of counsel.42 To prove
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel's
conduct did not meet an objective standard of reasonableness and that
counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant.43  This analysis should
accord a high degree of deference to defense counsel's performance." Evans
argued that re-sentencing counsel did not meet the objective standard of
reasonableness required because they did not conduct an adequate investiga-
tion of Evans's probable federal parole date.45 Evans claimed that if his
counsel had investigated adequately his likely parole date on his federal
convictions and used expert testimony at re-sentencing, it is reasonably
probable that the jury would not have sentenced him to death.'
Doeing v. State4 allows consideration at sentencing of the defendant's
parole eligibility if a life sentence is imposed, regardless of whether defen-
dant is parole ineligible.48 In Simmons v. South Carolina,49 the United States
Supreme Court decided that refusing to allow the defendant to advise the
jury of his parole ineligibility violated due process when the death penalty
was imposed, in part, because of future dangerousness.' Doering's reach is
more broad than future dangerousness.5" Parole evidence may be a mitigat-
ing circumstance because it is relevant to the jury's determination of
whether a life sentence should be imposed. 2
41. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
42. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (requiring a showing that
counsel was deficient and defendant was prejudiced by counsel's performance in order to
prove ineffective assistance of counsel).
43. Id. at 687.
44. Id. at 689.
45. Evans, 220 F.3d at 320. Evans also argued that defense counsel were deficient for
failing to interview witnesses whose testimony may have shown that Evans was not the
principal in the shootings. Id. at 317. However, the Fourth Circuit found that defense
counsel did not perform elow an objective standard of reasonableness by not interviewing
the additional witnesses. Id.
46. Id. at 321. Defense counsel learned from the federal penitentiary, where Evans was
serving his federal sentences, that Evans's possible date of parole would be in 1993 or 1996.
Id. at 320. As a result of the closeness to this date, Evans's counsel did not discuss his federal
parole at re-sentencing. Id.
47. 545 A.2d 1281 (Md. 1988).
48. Evans, 220 F.3d at 320; see Doering v. State, 545 A.2d 1281, 1295 (Md. 1988)
(allowing capital defendants to present parole eligibility testimony if a life sentence is
imposed).
49. 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
50. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 161-62 (1994) (finding that when future
dangerousness is considered, due process requires that the jury be informed of the defendant's
parole eligibility).




Rather than focusing on parole evidence stemming from Evans's federal
convictions, defense counsel offered testimony that indicated that Evans was
unlikely to be paroled on his state convictions, but that in any event he
would not be paroled for several decades."3 The Fourth Circuit refused to
disturb the state court's decision, finding that defense counsel acted reason-
ably by depending on the information provided by the federal penitentiary
and focusing on Evans's state sentences and likely parole ineligibility.'
However, even assuming that defense counsel's strategy was deficient, the
court concluded that Evans was not prejudiced by the strategy."5 The
Fourth Circuit determined that expert testimony regarding Evans's federal
parole ineligibility would not have altered the decision of the re-sentencing
jury because defense counsel had provided evidence that Evans would likely
spend the remainder of his life in prison.' In conclusion, the court found
that it could not say that the state court's adjudication of Evans's claim in
the state habeasp roceedings was contrary to, or an unreasonable application
of, federal law.
C. District Court's Failure to Stay Federal Habeas Proceedings
Evans next argued that the district court erred in refusing to stay his
federal habeas proceeding pending the exhaustion of his Brady claim in state
court. s8 The Fourth Circuit implied that the following circumstances might
permit a federal court to stay habeas proceedings until a petitioner's claim
has been adjudicated in state court: (1) the threat of imminent execution;
(2) the need for a stay in order to preserve opportunity for federal review;
and (3) the disjointed proceeding resulting from a denial of the stay would
result in prejudice to the petitioner that outweighed the considerations of
finality and prompt adjudication required in habeas proceedings. 9 How-
ever, none of these circumstances were present in Evans's case.' First, there
was no threat of imminent execution. The State agreed not to pursue
execution while the defendant was arguing his Brady claim in state court or
53. Evans, 220 F.3d at 320. The defense argued that Evans would become eligible for





58. Id. The Fourth Circuit's review of the district court decision was based on an abuse
of discretion standard. Id. at 322. Evans's Brady claim was based on the account of a witness
who would testify that she saw an African-American man in the lobby prior to the shootings
who had been seated near a tan duffel bag. According to the witness, the man was approxi-
mately 5'7" or 5'8". Id. at 323. Evans's height is 5'2". Id. at 317.




his federal habeas petition. 1 Second, Evans was not precluded from request-
ing permission to file a second federal habeas petition if the state court were
to reject his Brady claim.' Finally, the court ruled that the district court
justifiably weighed the interests of finality and prompt adjudication and
determined that they outweighed Evans's interest in receiving a stay."' The
Fourth Circuit also rejected Evans's argument that he should be exempt
from the prohibition against filing successive federal habeas petitions.'
IV Implicationsfor Virginia Capital Practice
Defense counsel in Virginia should note that Evans is not a Virginia
case. However, the decision does have implications for capital litigation in
Virginia. First, individualized explanations for peremptory challenges are
not required." Second, if a petitioner wants to stay a federal habeas pro-
ceeding until the petitioner's state court claim has been adjudicated, counsel
should argue that there is a threat of imminent execution, a stay is necessary
to preserve opportunity for federal review, or that the petitioner would be
prejudiced from the disjointed proceeding created by a failure to stay, this
prejudice outweighing considerations of finality and prompt adjudication."
Third, and most important, is the role that evidence of prison life plays
in determining future dangerousness.' A defendant has the right to "deny




64. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. S 2244(b)(2)(A), (B) (2000) (allowing second habeas petition if the
claim is based on new constitutional law or if the claim could not have been discovered
previously and the facts, if proven, would prove by clear and convincing evidence that no
reasonable fact-finder could have found the petitioner guilty of the offense). The court found
that Evans failed to make a sufficient showing of cause and prejudice that would permit him
to fide a second habeas petition in federal court. Evans, 220 F.3d. at 323. The court found that
Evans did not satisfy the cause requirement for failure to discover the evidence and argue the
Brady claim earlier. Id. The court also found that the new evidence clearly was not strong
enough to prove by dear and convincing evidence that no fact-finder would have found
Evans guilty. Id. The Fourth Circuit distinguished two decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, Stewart v. Martinez- rdlareal and Slack v. McDaniel, that Evans chimed
enabled him to argue his Brady claim in a second habeas petition. Id. at 324; see Stewart v.
Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 643 (1998) (finding that a second habeas petition was not
prohibited when the petitioner sought a hearing on a claim that had been dismissed from the
first petition because it was not ripe); Slack v. McDaniel, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 1604-05 (2000)
(finding that a habeas petition was not considered successive when the first petition was
dismissed without prejudice).
65. Evans, 220 F.3d at 313.
66. See id. at 322.
67. SeeJason J. Solomon, Future Dangerousness: Issues and Analysis, 12 CAP. DEF.J. 55,
71-73 (1999) (arguing that prison life evidence rebuts evidence of future dangerousness).
2000]
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of death." For cases in which future dangerousness is the aggravating factor
used to seek the death penalty, the defendant is allowed to proffer evidence
to rebut future dangerousness.' Prison life evidence can rebut future
dangerousness to the extent that the degree of regimentation in prison
structure will have an effect on the inmate's ability to commit crimes.
70
Existence of other sentences adversely affects a defendant's in-prison classifi-
cation, elevatin the inmate's status to one in which greater control will be
exercised over the inmate. Therefore, these sentences imply that the defen-
dant will be in stricter custody during the sentence to be imposed in capital
sentencing than if the defendant were in a less restrictive custodial status.
As a result, the defendant is less likely to be a danger to others in prison
than he would be had he not had other sentences. In Cherrix v. Common-
wealth," the Supreme Court of Virginia refused to admit evidence of prison
life and its effect on future dangerousness when offered as mitigation.'
However, evidence of prison life related to the danger the defendant may
pose in the future should be admissible as rebuttal to future dangerousness.
The evidence should be prospective in nature and should show that the
defendant will not be a future danger in prison.74 If the Virginia courts
adopt the Doering rule and allow evidence of other sentences, juries will be
more informed and more likely to impose fair sentences.
James Ryan White
68. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977) (finding that due process is violated
when a defendant has no opportunity to respond to evidence that is relied upon to impose
a sentence of death). Evidence pertaining to the future dangerousness of defendant is one
aggravating factor used to narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty in
Virginia. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(C) (Michie 2000).
69. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1986) (finding that due process
requires that the defendant may present evidence to rebut future dangerousness when the
prosecution seeks the death penalty based on future dangerousness).
70. A defendant sentenced to life imprisonment will only pose a future danger to the
prison community. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(A) (Michie 2000) ("[A] defendant shall
not be eligible for parole if sentenced to imprisonment for life.*).
71. 513 S.E.2d 642 (Va. 1999).
72. Cherrix'v. Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 642, 653 (Va. 1999) (finding that evidence
of prison life is not admissible as mitigating evidence).
73. See generally Solomon, supra note 67.
74. See Cherrix, 513 S.E.2d at 653 & n.4.
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